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1 Introduction
Recent surveys of th e  lite ra tu re  regarding knowledge spillovers from FD I have concluded th a t  there 
exists little  consensus abou t the  m agnitude, direction or even the  existence of knowledge spillovers 
(B arba N avaretti and  Venables, 2004; Gorg and Greenaway, 2004). This may in p a rt be caused by 
econom etric problems. Specifically, it has been argued th a t  results depend crucially on th e  use of 
cross-section versus tim e-series data , or on th e  way in which m ultinational presence is m easured 
(Gorg and Strobl, 2001). Additionally, th e  intangible n a tu re  of knowledge spillovers impedes proper 
m easurem ent and  accordingly, precise empirical estim ation.
Although m easurem ent and  m ethodological problem s are potentially  valid reasons for the  lack of 
consistency in em pirical results, in th is  paper we pu t forward a theoretical explanation, th a t  deals 
w ith the  relationship between knowledge spillovers on th e  one hand, and  different types of FD I on 
th e  other. Specifically, we argue th a t  differing degrees of FD I ownership give rise to  different 
am ounts of knowledge spillovers. This observation is based on two grounds: F irst, some knowledge 
spillover channels are relevant for some types of FD I, whereas they  are irrelevant for others. Second, 
th e  large tac it com ponent in knowledge spillovers will cause differences in spillovers between various 
types of FDI.
More recently, some studies have taken  acknowledged the  relationship between knowledge 
spillovers and FD I ownership. M üller and Schnitzer (2006) develop a theoretical model in which they  
consider a Jo int Venture (JV) between a M NE and a Host C ountry (HC). They study  the  effects of 
spillovers and ownership on the  am ount of technology transfer (by MNE) and  on the  profits for bo th  
MNE and HC. They show, in ter alia, th a t  M N E’s profits strictly  increase in ownership and  stric tly  
decrease in spillovers bu t th a t  HC, by engaging in active ta x  or investm ent policy, can change M N E’s 
incentives to  the  advantage of HC. Specifically, although spillovers increase when the  M NE decreases 
its share of ownership, it m ay become optim al for M NE to  share ownership w ith HC, thus providing 
a rationale for a jo in t venture. Accordingly, HC can benefit from increased spillovers th rough active 
policy.
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Empirically, the  relationship between knowledge spillovers and  ownership has been studied as 
well, bu t the  results vary. Blom strom  and  Sjoholm (1999) do not find any evidence of a relationship, 
whereas Dimelis and Louri (2002) find evidence of m inority ownership inducing in tra-industry  
spillovers, in contrast to  m ajority  foreign-owned firms. At the  o ther end of th e  spectrum , Javorcik 
and  Spatareanu (2003) and  Javorcik (2004a) find evidence of fully foreign-owned firms inducing 
in tra-industry  spillovers, whereas partia l ownership induces in ter-industry  spillovers.
A common elem ent in all these studies is th a t  initially a linear relationship between foreign 
ownership and  (in tra industry) knowledge spillovers is assumed, i.e. either increased ownership 
increases spillovers due to  an  increase in technology transfer by th e  M NE, or it decreases spillovers 
due to  an  increase in M NE control (cf. Javorcik, 2006).1 O ur analysis deviates from these studies in 
th a t  we argue th a t  th e  relationship between ownership and spillovers is not linear, bu t curvilinear 
(concave). Moreover, we also incorporate absorptive ability as a factor influencing knowledge 
spillovers in our model, which has been shown to  be relevant (Cohen and  Levinthal, 1989; Grunfeld, 
2003; Keller, 2004). Additionally, th e  num ber of host country firms will be of some im portance, as 
th is  influences M NE profits.
O ur theoretical model shows th a t  MNEs will typically choose ra ther extrem e degrees of 
in tegration  when engaging in a foreign venture. T h a t is, they  will usually require fairly high or fairly 
low degrees of ownership. Only when sunk costs or absorptive ability  are suff ciently low will the  
MNE be willing to  invest a t more equal degrees of ownership. All th is is due to  the  perceived 
spillover th re a t of engaging in equally owned jo in t ventures.
Since m any transition  countries have functioned as im portan t hosts of F D I in recent years, as 
well as th e  fact th a t  governments of some of these countries have been known to  impose ownership 
requirem ents on foreign investors, they  provide an  in teresting setting  to  em pirically te s t our model. 
Em ploying a d a tase t of approxim ately 400 firms in 22 transition  countries, the  em pirical results point
1In fact, this dichotomy in the relationship is the reason for Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) to have no ex ante 
expectation regarding the sign of the relationship.
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out th a t  the  relationship between FD I ownership and  knowledge spillovers m ay be concave, implying 
th a t  more equally owned types of FD I potentially  create the  largest spillover gains for the  local 
partner.
From a policy perspective, we find - in accordance w ith Müller and  Schnitzer (2006) - th a t  FD I 
policy in the  host country can (partly) align the  interests of th e  M NE and  its foreign partner, bu t 
th a t  there  exists a trade-off between such FD I policy and  host country policy aim ed a t increasing the 
absorptive ability  of local firms. Moreover, requiring shared ownership may have adverse effects, 
leading the  M NE to  invest in another country since th e  original investm ent may no longer be 
profitable. Instead, subsidizing the  FD I project, investing in local absorptive ability or im proving the 
quality  of local institu tions may sort larger gains for th e  transition  country.
The rem ainder of th is  paper is s truc tu red  as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the  theoretical 
model. Section 3 discusses th e  model im plications and  derives th ree testab le  propositions. Section 4 
presents the  empirical analysis and a discussion of the  results. Section 5 addresses some policy 
im plications th a t  follow from our model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 T he m odel
This section describes the  model th a t  derives the  relationship between knowledge spillovers and FD I 
ownership. Unlike earlier models in th is vein (cf. B lom ström  and  Sjöholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 
2002; Javorcik, 2004a; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2003; M üller and  Schnitzer, 2006) we deviate from 
th e  assertion th a t  th is  relationship is linear and instead propose a curvilinear, concave relationship. 
Before explaining the  rationale for th is approach, we first discuss the  model setup.
W hen faced w ith the  choice of investing abroad, the  M NE essentially makes two decisions: It 
decides w hether or not to  engage in FD I and  (provided th a t  it decides to  invest) a t w hat degree of 
in tegration  (i.e. ownership) to  do so. In our model, th e  in tegration decision is only determ ined by 
knowledge spillover considerations and, as we will discuss below, follows directly  from th e  investm ent 
decision. As a s ta rtin g  point, we consider technological space in the  host country in which the  MNE
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is considering to  invest. The location of b o th  th e  M NE and its poten tia l partn er firm in technological 
space is modeled in a Hotelling-like fashion (Hotelling, 1929). Specifically, we assume th a t  th e  n  host 
country firms are located a t equal distances from each other and  th a t  the ir location is fixed along a 
line. W ithou t loss of generality we normalize the  length of th is  line to  1 so th a t  the  distance between 
two local firms becomes 1 /n .2 Accordingly, for n  >  2 (an assum ption th a t  we will make throughout 
th e  paper), the  M NE will always locate in between two local firms. Technological distance x is then  
defined as the  distance between the  M NE and  the  local firm th a t  it is closest to, i.e. 0 <  x <  1 /2n. 
Given th a t th e  M NE decides to  invest (which it will only if net profits are nonnegative, an  issue th a t 
we will re tu rn  to  later) the  problem  it faces is to  choose the  degree of in tegration  th a t  maximizes 
profits net of knowledge spillovers. This calls for a relationship between knowledge spillovers and  the 
degree of integration.
The linear relationship th a t  is hypothesized in much of th e  earlier lite ra tu re  is based on the  view 
th a t  either higher in tegration gives the  M NE more control over the  transferred  knowledge and 
consequently leads to  less knowledge spillovers, or th a t  higher integration will induce the  M NE to  
transfer more of its own technology to  the  foreign JV  and  hence lead to  higher spillovers.3 
Accordingly, the  sign of th e  relationship has been left as an em pirical m atte r, bu t the  evidence - as 
was m entioned before - is ambiguous.
In th is paper we argue th a t  the  linearity assum ption (either positive or negative) may be wrong 
for two reasons. The first reason hinges on th e  fact th a t  the  linearity assum ption fully disregards the 
different channels th rough which knowledge spillovers from FD I occur. The tree  m ain channels th a t 
have been distinguished in previous lite ra tu re  are labor turnover, vertical linkages and  dem onstration  
effects (Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; Saggi, 2002). Taking these into account, it can be argued th a t
2We ignore endpoint problems because our focus is on the MNE’s location decision between two host firms, and not
on modeling competition between host firms.
3Note that there is an explicit distinction between a knowledge transfer and a knowledge spillover. The former is
a purposeful transmission of knowledge, either from the parent to the JV or between the JV partners. The latter is 
an externality, i.e. an unconscious diffusion of knowledge from one JV partner to the other. Accordingly, a knowledge 
spillover may be the result of a knowledge transfer.
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different types of FD I (in term s of integration) lead to  the  (unintended) employm ent of different 
com binations of spillover channels. In fact, under the  plausible assum ption th a t, ceteris paribus, the  
degree of effective knowledge spillovers is positively related to  the  num ber of relevant knowledge 
spillover channels, we argue th a t  interm ediately in tegrated  types of FD I potentially  lead to  the 
highest spillovers. The reason is th a t  such types of FD I possibly employ all th ree distinguished 
knowledge spillover channels. M inority types of FD I on th e  o ther hand  only lead to  dem onstration 
effects and  vertical linkages, whereas m ajority  types of FD I only trigger labor turnover as a spillover 
channel. Accordingly, we expect a curvilinear, concave relationship to  appear between in tegration 
and  knowledge spillovers due to  the  related  num ber of spillover channels.
The second reason for such a relationship relies on the  ta c it com ponent of knowledge, as 
opposed to  its codified com ponent. The tac it com ponent of knowledge is em bodied in people, 
routines and  practices and  requires inform al and  flexible m echanisms to  spill over, such as personal 
in teraction or com m unication. The codified com ponent on the  o ther hand  is em bodied in tangibles, 
such as blueprints and  products, and  more easily allows for spillovers th rough  for instance reverse 
engineering or im itation  (M akhija and  Ganesh,1997). Given th a t  codified knowledge spillovers can 
largely be prevented by m eans of patenting, th is  implies th a t  a large p a rt of spillovers are bound to  
be tac it. Hence those types of FD I th a t  require intensive (and informal) com m unication and 
cooperation between all parties involved will potentially  create the  largest spillovers.4 Such a 
situation  will arise when the  venture is more or less equally shared, giving another reason to  expect a 
concave relationship between the  degree of in tegration  and  knowledge spillovers.5 Moreover, since 
such alliances are often aim ed a t creating  synergies th rough learning (M akhija and  Ganesh, 1997)
they  require some m inim um  am ount of knowledge transfer ( th a t is, purposefu l knowledge
4 Indeed, in a study of Danish telecommunication firms, Dahl and Pedersen (2004) find informal contacts between
employees to be an important channel of knowledge difussion.
5 A related argument put forward by, inter alia, Beamish and Banks (1987) and Blodgett (1992) is that International
Joint Ventures (IJVs) with more equal ownership structures promote higher levels of trust between partners and hence 
lead to increased knowledge exchange.
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transm ission between the  parties involved - see footnote 3). This knowledge transfer allows bo th  
parties to  integrate the  o th e r’s knowledge base and thereby fu rther strengthens spillover potential, 
for instance by adding to  the  absorptive capacity of the  local partner (Lane et al., 2001).6
D enoting the  M N E’s degree of in tegration by I  we can denote the  concavity in I  by the 
following relationship:
g (I) =  - 1 2 +  I  (1)
In our model, the  degree of in tegration  I  in tu rn  is determ ined by th e  technological distance x 
between the  M NE and  its local partner. We can model th is  relationship in two distinct ways. On the 
one hand, we could model a positive relationship between I  and x. The view th a t  underlies such a 
relationship perceives technological proxim ity as an  opportunity. This implies th a t  the  M NE values a 
partnersh ip  more when th e  partn er is technologically more sim ilar to  the  MNE. Accordingly, it will 
lower its degree of integration. A lternatively, one could argue th a t  the  M NE will consider 
technological proxim ity as a th re a t and thus increases its degree of integration  when its partner is 
technologically more similar. This view is in line w ith more established theories of the  M NE such as 
th e  OLI-paradigm  (Dunning, 1977) and  the  knowledge-capital model of FD I (M arkusen, 2001). 
Moreover, it also accords w ith argum ents p u t forward by M akhija and Ganesh (1997) and  M ultinelli 
and  Piscitello (1998) th a t  asym m etry in capabilities between JV  partners is one of th e  key 
m otivations to  form a JV  in th e  first place. Therefore we specify a negative relationship between 
in tegration  and  technological distance: The larger the  technological sim ilarity between the  partners, 
th e  higher the  M N E '’s degree of integration, hence:
I  = 1  — 2xn s.t. 0 <  x <  1 /2n  (2)
Note th a t  th is form ulation ensures th a t  I  is bounded on the  dom ain [0, 1].
So far we have only considered the  M N E '’s in tegration decision and its consequences for the
6Indeed, Lyles and Salk (1996) found evidence that IJVs with 50/50 ownership control had significantly higher levels 
of knowledge acquisition than majority controlled IJVs.
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extent of spillovers. However, the  local p a rtn e r’s ability to  absorb external knowledge may be 
another factor influencing the  degree of knowledge spillovers th rough partly-ow ned FD I (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; Keller, 2004; Lane et al., 2001). A lthough th is  factor has not yet been explicitly 
taken  into account in studies m odeling the  relationship between spillovers and  FD I ownership, 
Dimelis and  Louri (2002, p.466) hint a t its im portance: "Differences in responses [to differing degrees 
of foreign presence] between high and  low productiv ity  dom estic firms should also be taken  into 
account in the  design of the  appropria te  [FDI] policy."
We split absorptive capacity into two com ponents: absorptive ability and  absorption potential. 
B oth  these com ponents are related to  th e  degree of technological sim ilarity between the  M NE and its 
partner: If bo th  firms are technologically very sim ilar absorptive ability is high because the  partner 
firm is technologically able enough to  absorb th e  M N E’s knowledge. However, absorption poten tia l is 
low in th is case, due to  the  absence of a large technological gap (and thus learning potential) between 
th e  M NE and  its partner. Conversely, if bo th  firms are technologically very dissimilar, absorptive 
ability  is low because the  partn er firm does not have the  technological requirem ents to  absorb the 
M N E’s knowledge. B u t now, because of th e  presence of a large technological gap, absorption 
poten tia l is high. B oth  effects combined therefore imply a curvilinear, concave relationship between 
technological distance and  the  am ount of knowledge spillovers th rough absorptive capacity h(x):
h(x) =  x ( ----- ox) s.t. a >  2 (3)
n
where a is the  inverse of absorptive ability  and  the  x in front of the  parentheses represents absorption 
potential. T he inclusion of the  term  1 /n  guarantees th a t  h(x) reaches its optim um  w ithin the  dom ain 
of the  m odel.7 To see this, recall th a t  technological distance x is defined w ith respect to  the  local 
firm th a t  is closest to  th e  MNE, so th a t 0 <  x <  1 /2n. Given our discussion of th e  curvilinearity
7This formulation also implies that absorptive capacity h(x) decreases as the number of local firms n increase. An 
intuition for this is that for a given amount of absorptive capacity, for instance in terms of skilled labor present in the 
host economy, an increase in n will lead to a decrease in absorptive capacity per firm, due to a reallocation of skilled 
labor over the extended set of local firms.
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between S  and x, th is implies th a t  h(x) should reach its optim um  w ithin th is  interval: This is indeed 
guaranteed by th e  inclusion of the  term  1 /n , given the  restriction a >  2.
We are now able to  construct a spillover function th a t  depends b o th  on th e  M N E’s degree of 
in tegration  g ( I  ) and  the  local partn er firm s’ absorptive capacity h(x):
S  =  F  [g(I),h (x )] (4)
For simplicity, we assume th a t  F (.) is a positive additive function of its argum ents. Accordingly, 
using the  form ulations in (1), (2) and  (3) we arrive a t th e  following explicit form ulation of the  
spillover function:8
S  =  —x 2(a +  1) +------ (5)
2n
O f course, the  M N E’s in tegration  decision is not solely dependent on the  am ount of spillovers it 
faces. Therefore, we also introduce a simple profit function. We assume th a t  JV  profits (i.e. the  
profits of bo th  the  M NE and  its partn er firm) are positively related  to  technological distance x (again 
in line w ith the  need for asym m etry  assum ption) and  negatively related to  the  to ta l num ber of local 
firms (which represents a m arket stealing effect):
x
■k j v  =  -  (6)
n
The M N E’s share of these profits is th en  proportional to  its degree of ownership I ,  m inus some 
am ount of sunk costs c th a t it has to  incur when investing in the  host country:
/  x \  9 x
^ m n e  =  I  -  ) -  c =  —2x +------- c (7)
n n
Note th a t  the  M NE profit function thus becomes a concave function of technological distance 
and  also of the  degree of in tegration (by virtue of (2)). This implies th a t increased technological
8While adding g(I) and h(x) we scale down the former by 4n2. The reason for doing so is that we have no ex ante 
motivation to expect a relationship between S  and n through I. Indeed, the only reason for 2n to appear in (2) is to 
assure that I  is bounded on [0,1]. Hence by dividing g(x) by 4n2 we get rid of the unwanted concave transformation on 
2n in (2).
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distance first leads to  increased M NE profits (at a decreasing rate), then  reaches a m axim um  and 
thereafter lowers M NE profits (at an  increasing ra te). This relationship is caused by two opposing 
effects following from an increase in x: O n the  one hand, an  increase in x induces an  increase in K jv  
(and thus an  increase in k m n e ) due to  an  increase in asym m etry between th e  M NE and its partner. 
O n th e  o ther hand, an increase in x also induces a decrease in I  and  thus lowers M N E’s share of 
'K jv . As long as the  former effect outweighs the  la tte r, M NE profits will increase.
An im portan t im plication from the  concavity of M NE profits and  knowledge spillovers w ith 
respect to  I  is th a t  we ob tain  potentially  two M NE partic ipation  constraints. W ithou t the  presence 
of knowledge spillovers, the  partic ipation  constrain ts could simply be derived from the  condition th a t 
k m n e  >  0. However, since we explicitly allow for knowledge spillovers, th is condition becomes 
k m n e  — S  >  0. Note th a t  when th is  condition is satisfied, not only do we know th a t  the  M NE will 
engage in FDI, bu t we can also im m ediately derive the  degree(s) of in tegration a t which it will do so. 
We illustra te  th is graphically by m eans of Figure 1 below.
< <  IN S E R T  F I G U R E  1 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
The solid curve in the  figure denotes spillovers S  and  the  dashed curve denotes M NE profits 
k m n e , b o th  as a function of th e  degree of integration. The partic ipation  constrain t is determ ined a t 
th e  point where knowledge spillovers are equal to  profits. From the  figure it follows th a t  there  are 
potentially  two partic ipation  constraints: One lower constrain t I l  and  one upper constrain t I u . In 
between these two constraints, knowledge spillovers are larger th a n  M NE profits and  the  M NE will 
not invest in the  host country. Consequently, only for degrees of in tegration lower th a n  I l  or above 
I u  will the  M NE invest in the  host country.
More formally, we can derive th e  participation  constrain ts by le tting  S  in (5) equal k m n e  in (7) 
and  th en  using (2) to  express th e  found x values in term s of I . This yields:
I l =  1 -  7 -^ T T  ; I u =  1 -  7 -^ T T  (8)(a — 1) (a — 1)
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where
A =  2 n  * ?  +  4c(o -  1) (9)
Note th a t  the  existence of either partic ipation  constrain t is not guaranteed. In th e  Appendix we 
derive specific cost conditions to  assure the  existence of one or b o th  of th e  partic ipation  constraints. 
Furtherm ore, we would like to  note th a t  the  condition k m n e  ~  S  >  0 is more restrictive th an  
i m n e  >  0 iff S  >  0. Indeed, in our model we only allow for positive knowledge spillovers. Negative 
spillovers would effectively im ply knowledge spilling over from the  partn er firm to  the  MNE; although 
earlier lite ra tu re  has identified conditions under which th is may happen (Driffield and  Love, 2003; 
Fosfuri and  M otta, 1999) it is not our present focus, since we assume th a t  th e  M NE is technologically 
more advanced th a n  its local p a rtn e r.9 Or, in the  words of Kuem m erle (1999), in th is  paper we only 
consider hom e-base-exploiting  FD I and not hom e-base-augm enting  FDI.
3 M odel im plications
The model developed in the  previous section yields some in teresting  im plications, bo th  from a policy 
perspective as well as from an  em pirical point of view. In th is section we will discuss the  com parative 
sta tic  properties of the  model and  derive some testab le  propositions. A discussion of the  policy 
im plications is postponed until Section 5.
In our model, th ree param eters determ ine the  decision of MNEs to  engage in FD I and  the ir 
choice of ownership (n, a and  c). Since we have potentially  two partic ipation  constraints, we also 
have to  check the  com parative sta tics for bo th . Table 1 below sum m arizes all the  com parative sta tic  
effects in our model, evaluated a t the  two partic ipation  constraints. W hat follows is a largely 
intuitive discussion of these effects. A more formal derivation of the  com parative sta tics is relegated 
to  the  Appendix.
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  1 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
9 This also seems an acceptable assumption in the case of most IJVs in transition countries, to which we will turn in 
Section 4.
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F irst consider the  influence of a change in the  num ber of local firms n  on th e  two participation  
constraints. From the  tab le  it follows th a t  the  direction of change in th e  lower participation  
constrain t, induced by an  increase in n, depends on the  level of sunk costs c. Specifically, as long as 
c <  0 th is derivative is positive, im plying th a t  the  lower partic ipation  constrain t will increase 
following an increase in n .10 Moreover, in the  A ppendix we show th a t  I u  only exists for c <  0. Hence 
it follows th a t  as long as bo th  partic ipation  constrain ts exist (i.e. as long as c <  0), an  increase in the  
num ber of local (com petitor) firms will induce the  M NE to  invest a t more equal degrees of 
integration. The reason for th is  is th a t  an  increase in n  will lead bo th  JV  profits and  spillovers to  
decrease, bu t the  la tte r decreases faster th a n  the  form er.11 Accordingly, given th a t  n e t profits are 
thus increasing over the  entire range of ownership structures, the  M NE will be able to  opt for more 
equal degrees of ownership while still obtain ing nonnegative net profits. However, as soon as Iu  
disappears (i.e. as soon as c >  0), an  increase in n  will cause the  M NE to  lower its degree of 
in tegration  unambiguously, i.e. the  sign of 9 IL /9 n  becomes negative. Since I l  is located a t relatively 
low degrees of integration, the  M NE will opt for increasingly lower degrees of in tegration  after an 
increase in n  to  com pensate th e  profit loss by a decrease in spillover costs.1 2 Hence we arrive a t the 
first testab le  proposition:
P r o p o s i t io n  1 A n  increase in  the num ber o f  local (com petitor) firm s w ill have an am biguous effect 
on the observed degree o f  M N E  ow nership in  a J V  between a M N E  and a local firm .
Second, consider the  influence of a change in absorptive ability 1 /a  on the  participation 
constraints. From the  tab le  it follows th a t  a decrease in absorptive ability (i.e. an increase in a) will 
cause the  M NE to  invest a t more equal degrees of ownership (i.e. I l will shift up and I u will shift
10It may appear nonsensical to allow for negative sunk costs. However, we explicitly consider these as they may be the 
result of government policies aimed at attracting FDI. Surely, such policies are readily observed in practice (Blomstrom
and Kokko, 2003; Davies, 2005).
11From (7) and (5) it can be derived that, ceteris paribus, spillovers decrease by a fraction of 3/2 of JV profits.
12Recall from Figure 1 that 1 1  is located to the left of the spillover maximum. Accordingly, increasing integration
would serve to increase spillover costs.
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down). More equal ownership structures become more a ttractive, since now there  is less poten tia l of 
knowledge spilling over to  the  partner. Consequently, th e  cooperative gains m otivation in favor of 
cooperation tends to  dom inate the  spillover-hazard argum ent against cooperation as absorptive 
ability  weakens. This yields th e  second proposition:
P r o p o s i t io n  2 A n  increase in  the absorptive ability o f  the local p a rtn er f ir m  w ill cause the M N E  to 
choose m ore extrem e (i.e. less equal) degrees o f  ow nership in  a J V  w ith  a local firm .
Finally, consider the  effect of a change in sunk costs. The tab le  indicates th a t  an increase in sunk 
costs will lead the  M NE to  invest a t more extrem e degrees of ownership (i.e. I  l  will shift down and 
I u will shift up). If the  M NE is already highly in tegrated, increasing sunk costs will lead it to  further 
increase its degree of ownership in order to  recoup th e  increased sunk costs by cap tu ring  a larger p a rt 
of JV  profits. O n the  o ther hand, if the  M NE has only a small degree of ownership to  begin w ith, it 
will not choose to  increase its degree of integration because in th a t  case, knowledge spillovers will 
increase as well. Therefore it will further decrease ownership, thereby decreasing its spillover costs 
and  thus com pensating for the  increased sunk costs. This leads to  our th ird  and  final proposition:
P r o p o s i t io n  3 A n  increase in  the su n k  costs incurred by the M N E  w ill cause the M N E  to choose 
m ore extrem e (i.e. less equal) degrees o f  ow nership in  a J V  between a M N E  and a local firm .
If our assum ptions regarding the  concavity of th e  relationship between ownership and spillovers 
on the  one hand, and  profits and  ownership on the  o ther hand  are correct, and consequently th a t  our 
model im plications hold as well, we should be able to  corroborate the  above propositions empirically. 
We tu rn  to  such an investigation in the  next section.
4 Em pirical evidence
In th is section we will em pirically te s t our theoretical model by investigating w hether the  
propositions derived in Section 3 can be confirmed. As we already noted before, earlier papers have
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modeled or assum ed a linear relationship between knowledge spillovers and  ownership (Blom strom  
and  Sjoholm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2001; Javorcik, 2004a; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2003), bu t 
th e  evidence in favor of th is linear relationship has been ra th e r mixed. Therefore, our empirical 
investigation should be viewed prim arily as a te s t regarding th e  validity of our hypothesized 
curvilinear relationship between ownership and knowledge spillovers.
4 .1  D a ta  an d  m e th o d
From an  em pirical point of view, the  countries in C entral and  E astern  Europe make an  interesting 
set of te s t cases for our present purposes. F irst of all, the  flow of FD I into m any of these countries 
has increased substantially  during the  past years due to  the ir transition  from centrally planned to  
m arket economies. Second, the  governments in these countries have been known to  restric t foreign 
ownership in particu lar cases, thus conveying the ir suspicion regarding the  relationship between 
ownership s tructu re  and  the  extent to  which th is may benefit the  local economy (Hoekm an and 
Javorcik, 2006; Lyles and Salk, 1996).
Because we have no com m and over any firm-level d a tase t perta in ing  to  transition  countries 
which allows us to  sim ultaneously calculate productiv ity  m easures as well as degrees of MNE 
ownership, we will investigate the  propositions of Section 3. The d a ta  for our empirical analysis are 
derived from the  W orld B ank’s Business Environm ent and  E nterprise Perform ance Survey (BEEPS). 
This survey contains d a ta  on 4104 firms in 22 transition  countries over th e  period 1999-2000. The 
questions in the  survey m ainly address issues regarding the  (institutional) business environm ent and 
its influence on the  firm ’s functioning and  perform ance. Yet some of these variables may be 
in terpreted  as proxies for sunk investm ent costs, num ber of com petitor firms and absorptive ability.
In the  original database, only 500 firms are (partly) foreign owned. Since our model does not 
concern purely dom estically owned firms, we lim it our sam ple to  these 500 firms. However, in 
m atching th e  observations of the  different variables included in the  regressions we lose another 110 
observations, so th a t  390 firms remain.
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As our dependent variable we com pute a dummy, tak ing  the  value of 1 for equally owned 
subsidiaries, and  0 for minority, m ajority  of fully owned firms. D eterm ining the  boundaries in degree 
of ownership for which a firm is m arked as "equally owned” is of course som ewhat arbitrary . 
Therefore, we experim ent w ith different intervals ranging from 33%-66% to  45%-55% as the  ranges 
for which we in terp ret ownership as equally shared. Accordingly, our dependent variable measures 
th e  probability  of observing an  equally owned JV.
The first explanatory  variable, com petitors , measures the  perceived num ber of com petitors in 
th e  dom estic m arket and  is thus a m easure for n. Since Proposition 1 in Section 3 predicts an 
am biguous effect of n  on I , we do not have any ex ante  expectations regarding th is variable. Skilled  
w orkers m easures th e  actual level of skilled workers in the  firm relative to  the  desired level on a scale 
from 1 to  6. A score of 1 denotes a relatively high degree of absorptive ability whereas a score of 6 
denotes relatively low absorptive ability. According to  P roposition 2, an increase in absorptive ability 
will lead to  less equal degrees of integration. Hence we expect the  sign of th is variable to  be positive. 
We also in teract th is variable w ith a dummy, Skilled  w orkers X  E U  D u m  th a t  takes the  value 1 for 
those transition  countries th a t  have recently become a m em ber of th e  E uropean U nion.13 The reason 
for doing th is is th a t  we expect differing effects between EU accession and non-accession countries. 
Specifically, since institu tions governing the  protection of (intellectual) property  rights are generally 
b e tte r  developed in the  EU accession countries, it can be expected th a t  the  cooperative gains of 
absorptive ability may be larger relative to  the  spillover losses.14 Hence, we expect the  m agnitudes of 
the ir coefficients to  differ. Finally, the  variables sta te  in vestm en t, credit obstacles and sta te  
em p lo ym en t in te rven tio n  m easure the  am ount of fixed investm ent th a t  is financed th rough the  sta te  
government (as a % of to ta l fixed investm ent), the  firm ’s perceived obstruction  of receiving 
(inform ation on) credit (on a 1-4 scale) and  the  regularity  w ith which the  government intervenes in
13In our sample these are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.
Cyprus and Malta (the remaining two recent EU accession countries) are not included in the sample.
14From Table 1 (p.47) in Javorcik (2004b) it indeed follows that 5 of the 8 EU-10 accession countries that are included
in her sample score above average on the Ginarte and Park index of intellectual property rights.
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th e  firm ’s employm ent decisions (on a 1-6 scale) respectively. These th ree variables may thus be 
regarded as being related  to  sunk/fixed costs c of investm ent. From Proposition 3 we know th a t 
increased sunk costs lead to  more extrem e degrees of in tegration  in our model. Accordingly we 
expect negative coefficient signs for bo th  credit obstacles and  sta te  em p lo ym en t in te rv en tio n  and  a 
positive coefficient for sta te  in vestm en t. Table 2 below provides some sum m ary sta tistics and 
correlation coefficients.
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  2 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
Given th a t our dependent variable is a binary  variable th a t  takes the  value of 1 when the  firm 
JV  is equally owned and  0 otherwise (i.e. m inority, m ajority  or fully foreign owned), th e  appropriate 
econom etric m ethod is probit analysis. Accordingly, th e  following model will be tested  empirically:
Iequal =  $ (* i^ )  +  "i s .t. "  N (u, a") (10)
where $ ( .)  denotes the  standard  norm al d istribu tion  function and xi is a vector containing the 
explanatory  variables th a t  were discussed above. As an  additional rem ark, we would like to  note th a t 
th e  specification of th is model is in fact conditional on an  earlier decision by the  MNE, i.e. the  
decision to  engage in FD I in the  first place. I t thus would be more appropriate to  estim ate a 
two-stage probit, in which the  first equation describes the  probability  th a t  a firm engages in FD I and 
th e  second then  estim ates the  ownership decision. However, in the  database we have no inform ation 
regarding the  factors th a t  have been shown to  influence the  FD I decision (M arkusen, 2001) so th a t 
th is  tw o-step procedure is not feasible. However, Javorcik (2006) shows th a t  estim ating such a 
tw o-step procedure leads to  very sim ilar results as those obtained in the  one-step probit. Moreover, 
in our theoretical model, the  ownership decision directly follows from the  investm ent decision, so th a t 
also from a theoretical point of view, th e  one-step approach is som ewhat w arranted.
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4 .2  R e su lts  an d  d iscu ssio n
Table 3 below presents th e  estim ation results from the  model in (10). For three out of four 
regressions, the  coefficient on num ber o f  com petitors  is positive, which is (partly) in accordance w ith 
our expectations. However, it is never significant. I t should be noted however, th a t  th is variable 
takes on only th ree values: 1 if there  are no com petitors, 2 if there are 1-3 com petitors and 3 if there 
are more th a n  3 com petitors. Hence, th is variable does not allow for a great deal of variety and  th is 
m ay explain its insignificance in Table 3.
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  3 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
The coefficient on skilled w orkers is negative, and  (m arginally) significant when in teracted  w ith 
th e  EU-dummy. F irst of all, the  fact th a t th e  coefficient on skilled w orkers alone is insignificant bu t 
becomes significant when in teracted  w ith the  E U  d u m m y  indicates th a t  there  are indeed differing 
effects of absorptive ability  on the  degree of in tegration  between th e  EU accession countries vis-a-vis  
th e  non-accession countries. Second, the  negative coefficient of the  interaction variable is not in 
accordance w ith Proposition  2, since it implies th a t  a decrease in absorptive ability will actually  
lower M N E’s incentives to  engage in equally owned types of FD I. However, as m entioned in the 
previous subsection, th is result could be driven by th e  fact institu tions governing property  rights are 
relatively b e tte r  developed in the  accession countries, im plying th a t  the  cooperative gains from 
increased absorptive ability  m ight outweigh the  spillover hazard. Nonetheless, we would th en  still 
expect to  see a positive and  significant coefficient for skilled workers. Accordingly, P roposition 2 
cannot be corroborated by these results.
The coefficient on sta te  in v e s tm e n t  is positive and  significant in th ree out of four regressions. 
This variable may be in terpreted  as a form of government subsidy to  a ttra c t new business by 
providing easy capital for financing sunk investm ent. Accordingly, more s ta te  investm ent implies 
lower relative sunk costs. In our model, th is in tu rn  implies more equally shared FD I types, which is 
in accordance w ith these empirical results. The coefficient on credit obstacles is negative, as we
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expected given th a t  higher credit obstacles potentially  increase sunk investm ent costs. However, it is 
insignificant in all regressions. The coefficient on sta te  em p lo ym en t in te rv en tio n  is negative and 
significant in th ree out of four regressions. G iven th a t  s ta te  employm ent intervention such as 
dism issal-protection increases operating  costs, again th is result is in line w ith our expectations.
A nother fact th a t  stands out from Table 3 is th a t  whereas the  first th ree regressions perform  
reasonably well in term s of the  significance of the  explanatory  variables, the  fourth  clearly 
underperform s. An obvious reason for th is  is th a t  th e  interval in which firms are considered as 
"equally shared ” in the  final model is relatively small com pared to  the  intervals of the  o ther models. 
In fact, for 33% <  I  <  66% there  are 125 equally shared firms, for 40% <  I  <  60% th is num ber is 106 
and  for 45% <  I  <  55% there  are 64. Thus th is num ber decreases relatively strongly in th e  final 
model, indicating th a t  th is  interval could very well be too  small.
As we already discussed before, some transition  countries im pose(d) legal requirem ents 
regarding the  extent of ownership th a t  a foreign firm is allowed to  control in dom estic firms (cf. 
Golub, 2003; Javorcik, 2006). R ationales for such requirem ents are often along the  lines of th e  desire 
to  m aintain  the  sovereignty of specific industries (such as defense) or the  belief th a t  restricting  
foreign ownership allows more easy access to  foreign technology. W hichever the  reason, such 
restrictions effectively im ply th a t  FD I is less th a n  fully owned simply because th is  is im posed by law. 
Accordingly, observing equally owned types of FD I and relating th is to  spillover considerations in 
such countries would be false. In order to  correct for this, we re-estim ate the  model in (10) now 
including country-dum m ies to  correct for in ter alia legal ownership restrictions. Table 4 below 
presents the  results.
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  4  A B O U T  H E R E  > >
The results in the  tab le  indicate th a t  the  estim ates are quite robust to  th e  inclusion of country 
dummies. A notable change is th e  (total) effect of absorptive ability on the  probability  of observing 
equally owned types of FDI. In th is case we observe a positive and  significant effect of skilled w orkers 
individually, and a notably  stronger negative effect of th is  variable in teracted  w ith th e  EU dummy.
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Indeed, the  observed positive effect is in accordance w ith Proposition  2 and indicates th a t  in the  
non-accession countries, increased absorptive capacity decreases the  M N E’s incentives to  equally 
share the  JV  project. As explained above, relatively weak property  rights protection could be a t the  
heart of th is  effect, im plying th a t  the  spillover hazard  of increased absorptive ability dom inates the  
poten tia l gains th rough  cooperation. In line w ith th is argum ent, we again observe th a t  th e  opposite 
holds in th e  EU accession countries.
Sum m arizing these results in term s of our th ree propositions in Section 3, we find th a t 
proposition one has neither been confirmed nor rejected, whereas proposition th ree has largely been 
confirmed by th e  em pirical results. Proposition  2 is confirmed for non accession countries and 
rejected for EU accession countries. I t appears th a t  th e  cooperative gains from the  presence of skilled 
workers outweighs th e  spillover costs for the  la tte r group, while th e  opposite holds in the  former 
group. Accordingly, the  evidence for transition  countries seems to  be quite supportive of our 
theoretical model, hypothesizing a curvilinear relationship between knowledge spillovers and 
ownership. However, it is noted th a t  they  should be in terpreted  w ith caution, since they  do not test 
th e  direct relationship between knowledge spillovers and  FD I ownership.
5 P olicy  im plications
In th is section we will briefly consider some of our m odel’s policy im plications. M any of these already 
follow form th e  derived propositions in Section 3. Again consider the  effect of varying sunk costs in 
our model. Obviously, sunk costs affect the  partic ipation  constraints only th rough M NE profits in
(7). Suppose th a t  sunk costs decrease: In term s of Figure 1 th is implies th a t, ceteris paribus, the 
M NE profit curve will shift upward, shifting the  two partic ipation  constrain ts inward and 
consequently inducing th e  M NE to  consider investing a t more equal degrees of integration. For the 
local p artn er firm, th is  is a favorable developm ent since knowledge spillovers increase as well. 
Consequently, according to  our model, host country policies subsidizing inward FD I (or more 
accurately: inward JV  activity) can align the  incentives of bo th  th e  M NE and  its local partner,
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leading to  more equally owned JV s in which spillovers are h igher.15
Second, absorptive ability  affects the  partic ipation  constrain ts th rough th e  absorptive capacity 
function in (3). A decrease in absorptive ability  (i.e. and  increase in o) decreases effective spillovers 
S  in two ways: It makes spillovers commence only a t higher degrees of M NE integration  (in term s of 
Figure 1, th e  lower partic ipation  constrain t shifts outw ard, away from the  origin of the  figure) and it 
causes the  m axim um  am ount of effective spillovers to  decrease (in term s of Figure 1, the  optim um  of 
S  shifts down). These two effects combined can cause the  lower partic ipation  constrain t to  vanish 
altogether, im plying th a t  the  M NE will find it profitable to  invest for th e  entire range of I  below I u . 
However, although th is will thus again lead the  M NE to  consider more equally owned types of FDI, 
th is  is no longer in the  best in terest of th e  local partner, since the  spillover optim um  has shifted as a 
result of decreased absorptive capacity as well. Accordingly, from the  local p a rtn e r’s point of view, a 
favorable policy stra tegy  of the  host country government is to  stim ulate th e  creation of sufficient 
absorptive capacity, causing bo th  the  extent of spillovers as well as the  m axim um  am ount of effective 
spillovers to  increase.
Given th a t th e  government is budget constrained, there  thus arises a policy trade-off in th is 
model: The government budget can be directed either tow ard subsidizing inward FD I and  thus 
lowering sunk costs for the  investing MNE, or it can be used in order to  provide e.g. high quality 
education and  tra in ing  to  the  econom y’s labor force or to  stim ulate corporate and  public R&D 
program s, so th a t  absorptive capacity is increased (cf. W ang and  Blom strom , 1992: pp. 151-152). 
A lthough from a norm ative point of view it may be tem pting  to  conclude th a t investing in absorptive 
capacity would be first-best, it has to  be noted th a t  the  benefits of such a policy stra tegy  may take 
several years to  take effect. Indeed, a one-shot subsidy granted to  a poten tia l foreign investor will 
yield gains th a t  are alm ost instantaneous. Accordingly, the  optim al policy stra tegy  will depend on the
context in the  host economy and be influenced by issues such as rates of tim e preference, th e  extent
15 As mentioned, such FDI subsidizing policies are often observed empirically (cf. Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003; Davies, 
2005).
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to  which the  local government is budget constrained and  th e  com position of the  local labor force.
Moreover, an  additional im plication from the  model in Section 2 is th a t  im posing ownership 
requirem ents on foreign investors may have adverse effects on inward FD I. From Figure 1 it is clear 
im m ediately th a t  requiring JV  ownership to  be shared relatively equally w ith local firms may lead to  
negative net profits for th e  M NE and  hence deter th e  FD I project altogether. On the  o ther hand, in 
view of the  discussion above, com bining such requirem ents w ith additional FD I subsidizing policies 
could have the  intended effect if the  com bination of ownership requirem ents and granted subsidies is 
properly balanced.
Nonetheless, from the  em pirical investigation in Section 4 yet another issue arises: Instead  of 
focusing too  much on FD I subsidizing policies or im posing ownership requirem ents, governments of 
transition  countries m ay b e tte r  invest resources in im proving institu tions governing the  protection of 
(intellectual) property  rights. For the  em pirical results h in t a t the  fact th a t  MNEs are actually  more 
willing to  engage in equally owned types of FD I if such institu tions are b e tte r  developed despite the 
fa c t  th a t absorptive capacity o f  the local p a rtn er  is high. Hence im proving local institu tions may not 
only serve to  increase (high-tech) inward FD I (cf. Javorcik, 2004b) bu t also prom ote shared 
ownership of such IJVs.
6 C onclusion
In th is paper, we have proposed an alternative explanation for th e  diverse findings in the 
FDI-spillover lite ra tu re  th a t  is based on the  FD I ownership structures. Specifically, we have deviated 
from earlier lite ra tu re  by positing  a concave relationship between FD I ownership and  knowledge 
spillovers instead of a linear one. We also include absorptive capacity and the  num ber of local 
(com petitor firms) in our model in order to  derive partic ipation  constrain ts th a t  determ ine the  range 
of ownership degrees a t which the  M NE will be willing to  invest abroad, despite the  fact th a t 
spillovers exist.
The results of our theoretical model show th a t  the  M NE will typically choose ra th e r extrem e
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degrees of in tegration when investing abroad. However, th e  range of ownership degrees over which 
th e  M NE is willing to  setup a foreign production facility will increase due to  either a decrease in 
absorptive ability  of the  local firm and  a decrease in sunk costs. As a result, the  M NE will th en  be 
more willing to  engage in equally shared ventures w ith foreign partners, which benefits the  partner 
firm (and therefore also th e  host country) in term s of higher knowledge spillovers. The effect of an 
increase in the  num ber of local (com petitor) firms is ambiguous. Em ploying a d a tase t of 
approxim ately 400 firms in 22 transition  countries we indeed find th a t  these theoretical results are 
largely supported . Additionally, we find th a t  the  quality  of local institu tions may influence the  effect 
of absorptive ability on M N E’s incentives to  share its FD I project.
From a policy perspective, we argue th a t  in assessing the  am ount of money spent on subsidizing 
foreign activities, policy m akers should also recognize the  positive effect of increasing absorptive 
ability, for instance by im proving th e  provision of education or investing in R&D. Specifically, 
spending more money on FD I policy th rough subsidies may lead to  less investm ent in absorptive 
ability, im plying a trade-off between these two policy strategies. C ontext specific factors such as the 
extent to  which the  government is budget constrained and the  general ra te  of tim e preference in the  
economy will eventually determ ine th e  optim al policy. Additionally, from our model it also follows 
th a t  im posing ownership requirem ents w ithout any additional policy m easures m ay serve to  deter 
inward FDI.
All in all, we believe to  have shown th a t FD I ownership may indeed affect knowledge spillovers 
in a non-trivial m anner. In em pirical economic m odeling th is  relationship has been largely absent. 
Those studies th a t  do take account of the  relationship have assum ed it to  be linear instead of 
concave. Indeed, the  lite ra tu re ’s broad neglect of the  relationship between FD I ownership structures 
and  knowledge spillovers could provide a possible explanation for the  apparen t lack of consensus in 
em pirical results. Accordingly, more em pirical research, specifically investigating a poten tia l concave 
relationship between knowledge spillovers and ownership, is w arranted
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A ppendix
P a r tic ip a tio n  C o n stra in t E x is te n c e
For analytical convenience, we express all the  participation  constrain ts in term s of technological 
distance x. Note th a t, by virtue of (2), I l  corresponds to  Xu and I u  corresponds to  X l.
In order to  see why the  existence of either one of the  partic ipation  constrain ts in (8) is not 
guaranteed, if suffices to  recall th a t  x is bounded between 0 and  1/2n. Accordingly, the  participation  
constrain t b  should also be located somewhere in between these two values in order to  be defined. 
Since we know the  exact dom ain on which x is defined, it is fairly straightforw ard to  derive some 
conditions th a t  guarantee the ir existence.
In order for the  lower constrain t to  exist, it has to  be located a t or above the  lower bound of the  
dom ain of our model, i.e. it has to  be larger th a n  or equal to  0. From th is it follows th a t:
We can derive the  cost condition th a t  guarantees the  existence of th e  upper partic ipation  constrain t 
in a sim ilar way:
th a t  a situation  may arise a t which M NE profits are larger th a n  knowledge spillovers over the  entire
c[1]
=*► c <  0
c[2]
From Figure 1 and  our form ulation of knowledge spillovers in (5) and profits in (7), it follows
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dom ain of 1 .16 In th is situation, b o th  partic ipation  constrain ts obviously do not exist. In order to  
determ ine under w hat condition th is s ituation  will arise, we note th a t  in the  lim it (i.e. in the 
situation  ju s t before profits become stric tly  larger th a n  knowledge spillovers over the  entire domain) 
th e  upper and lower partic ipation  constrain t will coincide (X l  =  X u ). From th is  we can derive a 
"lower bound” cost condition th a t  guarantees the  existence of the  partic ipation  constraint(s):
C 16n2(o -  l)  c[3]
If c[3] is not satisfied, M NE profits will thus be stric tly  higher th a n  knowledge spillovers over the 
entire dom ain and  no partic ipation  constrain t will exist. This can also be seen by noting th a t 
allowing c <  0 introduces the  possibility of a negative square root in (8). As it tu rn s  out, the  
condition th a t  ensures th is square root to  be nonnegative is the  same as c[3] which indeed implies 
th a t  if c[3] is not satisfied, the  partic ipation  constrain ts are not defined.
As m entioned in Section 2 we already established th a t  since we only allow for nonnegative 
knowledge spillovers, 'Km n e  — S  >  0 directly implies 'Km n e  >  S. Accordingly, if we establish a 
condition under which spillovers are positive and  relate th is to  the  partic ipation  constraints, we can 
establish a condition under which n e t  profits will be nonnegative. From (5) it is easily derived th a t 
S  >  0 requires x <  3 /  [2n(o +  l) ] .17 Accordingly, we also require our partic ipation  constrain t to  be 
less th a n  or equal to  th is  value. R ew riting th is  requirem ent of nonnegative n e t profits in term s of 
sunk costs c yields:
3 a _  2c < -----------------n c[4]
2 n 2 (o +  1)
We have now established four cost conditions. The question arises how they  com pare to  each 
other. To th is end, consider Figure 2 below. The figure plots the  four different cost conditions against 
different values of o on the  horizontal axis (the origin thu s takes a value of o =  2). W hile in terpreting  
th e  figure, note th a t  conditions c[1], c[2] and  c[4] are of th e  <  kind, while c[3] is of th e  >  kind.
16In fact, given that the curvature of the spillover function is tighter than that of the MNE profit function (i.e.
\d2'K/dx2\ < \d2S /d x 2\), profits can be strictly larger than knowledge spillovers even beyond the domain of the model.
17Obviously, the other value is x > 0 but since our model is bounded by 0 from below, this condition is automatically
satisfied in our model.
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< <  IN S E R T  F I G U R E  2 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
The area in between c[3] and  c[1] (i.e. the  a-axis) is the  area in which bo th  participation  
constrain ts exist. Note th a t th is  area lies entirely below c[4], so th a t  we can conclude th a t  M NE net 
profits are indeed nonnegative in th is  area. In th e  area between the  a-axis and c[4] only th e  upper 
partic ipation  constrain t exists while M NE net profits are still nonnegative. In the  area above c[4] bu t 
below c[2], the  upper partic ipation  constrain t exists as well, bu t here M NE net profits are negative, 
so th a t  the  M NE will not invest in th is area. For the  area below c[3], M NE profits are strictly  larger 
th a n  knowledge spillovers over the  entire dom ain of the  model, so th a t  there  are no participation  
constraints. Note th a t  as a !  1  (i.e. absorptive ability  goes to  zero) the  lim it of c[3] is 0 whereas the 
lim it of c[4] is 0 as well (by l ’H opital’s rule). This implies th a t  the  region in which the  participation  
constrain ts exist for positive M NE profits gradually disappears. Instead, the  region in which M NE 
profits th a t  are stric tly  larger th a n  knowledge spillovers increases gradually. This is of course due to  
th e  steady decrease in absorptive ability: In term s of Figure 1, th is  implies th a t  th e  spillover function 
will reach its optim um  for lower values of x. At the  same tim e, the  value of knowledge spillovers a t 
th is  optim um  will decrease as well. These two effects combined make knowledge spillovers peter out 
ra th e r quickly. A nother in terp re ta tion  of th is  result is th a t  as a increases, the  relevance of absorptive 
ability  for the  M N E’s in tegration  decision decreases. In the  lim it, all th a t  m atters  to  the  M NE in 
m aking its investm ent and in tegration  decision is the  am ount of sunk costs c.
C o m p a ra tiv e  S ta tic s
For analytical clarity, all derivatives are first com puted in term s of x and then  in I . The form ulation 
of the  partic ipation  constrain ts from (8) can be expressed in term s of x as:
XL =  2(a -  1) ’ XU =  2(a — 1)
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For all derivatives we will need the partial derivatives of A with respect to  the different parameters as
well:
9A
9n
9A
9o
---- ^  ±  +  4c(o -  1)
—  =  ±
9A
9c
—  =  ±
2n2 y 4n3 J  y 4n 2 
2c
+  4c(o -  1)
2(o -  1)
\J 4n? +  4c(o -  1)
Using th is in th e  derivatives of (8) we get the  results as displayed in Table 5:
< <  IN S E R T  T A B L E  5 A B O U T  H E R E  > >
In order to  determ ine th e  sign of the  derivatives, we check under which conditions (if any) they  
are larger th a n  zero.
9Xu
9n
- 2n  -  in? ( i ^  +  4c(o -  1))_
2(o — 1)
0
- 2n >  ( 4 n 2 + 4c(o - 1)
4 n 2 <<  1
4n2 +  4c(o -  1)
16n2c(a — 1) <  0 )  c <  0 
W here the  last inequality follows from our assum ptions th a t  n, a >  2. Hence d x u /@n >  0 iff c <  0.
dX L
9n
_  +  in 3 ( in 2 +  4c(o _  1))
2(o 1)
0
2n >  ( 4 n 2 + 4c(o - 1)
4 n 2 >>  1
in 2in2 +  4c(o — 1)
16n2c(a — 1) >  0 )  c >  0
W here the  last inequality again follows from n, a >  2. Hence 9X l/9«- >  0 iff c >  0. However, since 
according to  c[1] X l does not exist for c >  0 it follows th a t  in our model setup it always holds th a t 
@xl /@n <  0
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
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d x u  _  4c(a “  1K 4-* +  4c(a -  1 -  2 (2 -  +  \ l 4-* + 4c(a -  1))  >
9 a  4(a — 1)2 >
— 1 I-----------------------
2c(a -  ^  ( i + 4c(a - 10 >  2n  +  V ¿ - + 4c(a - 1)
~ 2c(a -  1) -  4^2 >  _1 _
\ J  4-* +  4c(a _  1) 2n
_ 4nc(a _ 1) _  _ n  >  ^  _ n _ + 4c(a _ 1)
16n2c2(a — 1) +  4c(a — 1) +------^ ^  +  4c(a — 1)4 n 2 4n2
16n2c2(a — 1) <  0
Given th a t  a, n  >  2 it follows th a t  th e  last inequality can never hold, which implies th a t 9Xu / 9a <  0.
9Xl  _  - 4c(a -  1 K 4-* +  4c(a -  2 -  2 ( 2-  -  4-* +  4c(a -  1))  >
9 a  4(a — 1)2 >
_ 1 ,---------------------
- 2c(» -  ^  ( 4 ? + 4c(a - 10 * >  2n  V4 ? + 4c(a “ 1)
2c(a — 1) +  4-2 ^  1
\Jik* +  4c(a _ 1) 2n
4nc(a _  1) +  2n  >  V  i + 4c(a _  1)
16n2c2(a — 1) +  4c(a — 1) +------^ ^  +  4c(a — 1)4 n 2 4n 2
16n2c2(a — 1) >  0
Again, given th a t  a, n  >  2 th e  last inequality will always hold, which implies th a t  9 x L /9 a  >  0.
9Xu =  2(a -  1K 4n* +  4c(a -  IQ) 2 >  0 
9c 2(a — 1) >
1 > 0
4 - 2  +  4c(a -  1)
Given our discussion regarding cost condition c[3] in the  previous p a rt of the  Appendix, th is 
inequality m ost always hold. Accordingly, in our model setup it will always hold th a t  9x u /9 c  >  0.
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9X l - 2(a -  1K S *  + 4c(a -  1))
9c 2(a -  1) 
1
0
4-2 +  4c(a -  1)
0
For the  same reason as before, th is inequality will never hold. Thus in our model setup it will always 
hold th a t  9 Xl / 9 c <  0.
From (2) we can derive th a t  I  =  1 — 2xn and accordingly th a t  I(X u ) =  1 — 2 x u n  and
I(X l ) =  1 — 2x Ln. Consequently, we obtain  th e  following:
@I (xu ) — [A+ +  n (9 A + /9 n )]
9n (a -  1)
+  4c(a -  1) -  4-* (4-* + 4c(a -  1)) 2
(a -  1) 
i n 2 >  i n 2 + 4c(a “  1)
0 >  4c(a — 1) )  c <  0
0
W here the  last inequality follows from the  fact th a t  a >  2. Hence 9 I(X u ) / 9 n  >  0 iff c <  0.
@I(xL) — [A +  n(9A  /9 n )]
9n (a -  1)
_\ / 4-* + 4c(a -  1) +  4-* ( 4-*  +  4c(a _  1))
0
(a -  1)
_ L  + 4c(a _  1) >  _ L
4c(a — 1) >  0 )  c >  0
W here the  last inequality follows from the  fact th a t  a >  2. Hence 9I(xL)/@ n >  0 iff c >  0. However, 
since according to  c[1] x l  does not exist for c >  0 it follows th a t  in our model setup it always holds 
th a t  @I(xL) /9 n  <  0
9 i (Xu ) =  _ 2 >  0
9a 9a
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*
*
91 (xL) =  _ 2 <  0
9a 9 a  <
This follows directly  from our discussion of 9Xu / 9a and  9 x L /9 a  above.
91 (Xu ) =  _ 2 <  0 
9c 9c <
91 (Xl ) =  _ 2 >  0 
9c 9c _
Again th is  follows im m ediately from our discussion of 9x u /9 c  and  9x l / 9 c  above.
32
Absorptive ability (inverse) - a
Figure 1: Cost conditions
Table 1: Comparative Static Results
P a ra m e te r d îL/d(.) d îu /ö(.)
n + /- “ -
a + -
c - +
Notes: (a) Negative if c>0, positive otherwise
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Table 2: S u m m a ry  S ta t is t ic s  an d  C o rre la tio n  C oefficients
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.Integr:33-66 0.32 0.47 1.00
2.Integr:40-60 0.27 0.45 0.89 1.00
3.Integr:45-55 0.16 0.37 0.64 0.73 1.00
4.Compet. 2.63 0.66 0.05 0.06 -0.01 1.00
5.State Inv. 1.02 7.15 0.14 0.11 0.08 -0.01 1.00
6.Credit Ob. 2.29 1.17 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 1.00
7.State Emp. 5.47 1.05 -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 -0.08 0.09 0.10 1.00
8. Skilled 3.81 1.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
9. EU x Skilled 1.57 2.03 -0.10 -0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.11 -0.09 0.03 0.29 1.00
Notes: Number of Observations = 390
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Table 3: P ro b i t  an a ly s is  of eq u a l o w nersh ip
33%<1<66% 33%< I <66% 40%< I <60% 45%< I <55%
Constant
-1.47 -1.42 -1.51 -0.99
(0.56) (0.55) (0.57) (0.57)
Competitors
0.08 0.08 (0.14) -0.01
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Skilled Workers
-0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.13*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Skilled Workers x
-0.06* -0.07** 0.01
EU-dum
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
State Investment
0.03*** 0.03** 0.02** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Credit Obstacles
-0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
State Employment
-0.17** -0.16** -0.15** -0.08
Interv.
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
McFadden R2 0.032 0.038 0.035 0.017
Log-Likelihood -236.8 -235.3 -220.2 -171.2
N 390 390 390 390
Notes: Huber/White-robust standard errors within parentheses. * = 0.1sig.
**=0.05 sig. ***=0.01 sig.
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Table 4: A nalysis of eq u a l o w nersh ip  in c lu d in g  fixed c o u n try  effects
33%</<66% 33%< I <66% 40%< I <60% 45%< I <55%
Constant
-1.98 -0.98 -1.00 -0.36
(0.63) (0.69) (0.70) (0.71)
Competitors
0.12 0.12 (0.21)* 0.04
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Skilled Workers
0.06 0.24** 0.23** 0.14
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Skilled Workers x
-0.44*** -0.49*** -0.43**
EU-dum
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
State Investment
0.03** 0.03** 0.02** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Credit Obstacles
-0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
State Employment
-0.17** -0.18** -0.14* -0.11
Interv.
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
McFadden R 2 0.134 0.145 0.035 0.017
Log-Likelihood -211.0 -209.0 -220.2 -171.2
N 390 390 390 390
Notes: Huber/White-robust standard errors within parentheses. * = 0.1sig.
**=0.05 sig. ***=0.01 sig.
Table 5: Comparative Static Derivatives
P a ra m e te r dx u /d (.) @x l /@(.)
n 1 9A+ 1 dA~2(a— 1) dn 2(a— 1) dn
a 9A+ /da [2(a-1)]-2A+ dA_ / da [2(a — 1)] — 2A_4(a-1)2 4(a— 1)2
c 1 dA+ 1 @A~2(a— 1) dc 2(a— 1) dc
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